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INTRODUCTION 
Legal parentage for childcare purposes under American state law is 
significantly and rapidly expanding.  The new parentage norms are growing 
increasingly imprecise.1  No longer is childcare parentage—that is, the 
superior right of a parent to the “care, custody, and control” of a child2—
only established by precise terms, such as distinct moments in time (i.e., 
birth), the existence of certain biological ties, a person’s status as married 
to the birth mother at time of her child’s birth, the inclusion of one’s name 
on a birth certificate, or formal adoption.  While these forms of precise 
childcare parentage establishment are still common, in increasing numbers, 
both men and women can now become childcare parents where the timing 
of the events establishing legal parentage is imprecise.  Under such 
circumstances, establishing parentage typically requires assessing a 
person’s earlier parental-like acts, such as the provision of financial support 
or the holding out of a child as one’s own.  Intent to be a parent, and not 
simply to be a child caretaker, is also usually key.3 
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 1  See, e.g., Rebecca Aviel, A New Formalism for Family Law, 55 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 2003 (2014) (advocating, upon reviewing imprecisions in the law, for a reimagined 
formalism rather than an expanded functionalism regarding parentage within nontraditional 
families).   
 2  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion) (noting that this 
parental interest “is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this 
Court”).   
 3  Intent to parent, whether in precise or imprecise laws, is often not critical when, for 
example, support rather than childcare parentage is at issue.  Generally, child support 
obligations arise for unwed biological fathers of children born of consensual sex whether or 
not they have childcare opportunities.  See Jason M. Merrill, Note, Falling Through the 
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Both precise and imprecise forms of establishing childcare parentage 
can now be overridden under new imprecise parentage disestablishment 
norms.  Whether labeled as rebuttals or rescissions of parental status under 
law, parentage disestablishments today often depend on assessing the 
parent-figure’s earlier conduct that occurred at no singular point in time, 
like the failure of the biological father of a child born of consensual sex to 
establish a bonded and dependent familial relationship with his child. 
Applying establishment and disestablishment norms of childcare 
parentage is often quite challenging due to the frequency of human 
relocation and legal variations in childcare parentage across states.  For 
example, complications can arise when a child is born to a woman and 
jointly raised for a while by her and another in one state, but then the birth 
mother and child move to a new state.  After the move, there is alleged to 
be a new second childcare parent, as well as a disestablished former second 
parent due to circumstances occurring at no single moment, but at times 
long after birth.  As one distinguished commentator observed: “The relative 
importance of biology, intent, contract, and parental function varies 
tremendously by jurisdiction and even by individual case, adding confusion 
and unpredictability to a determination of critical importance.”4 
Judicial inquiries into imprecise childcare parentage in both 
establishment and disestablishment settings would be greatly facilitated if 
American state lawmakers created new mechanisms for formal expressions 
of earlier and current parental and parental-like intentions.  As intent to 
parent often is quite relevant in such inquiries, these new mechanisms 
should facilitate determinations of imprecise childcare parentage.  Part I of 
this Essay first reviews current state imprecise childcare parentage laws 
and then considers the importance of parental intentions in such laws.  Part 
II suggests new mechanisms for formal declarations of intended childcare 
parentage.  Such declarations would not necessarily determine childcare 
parentage under law.  Still, they would be quite helpful when courts assess 
earlier actions when determining imprecise childcare parentage issues. 
I.    IMPRECISE CHILDCARE PARENTAGE LAWS 
Imprecise childcare parentage laws can lead to surprising, if not 
shocking, parental childcare interests.  In one case, childcare parentage was 
possible for a couple who cared for a child for ten years, after the birth 
 
Cracks: Distinguishing Parental Rights From Parental Obligations in Cases Involving 
Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship, 11 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 203 (2008).   
 4  Joanna L. Grossman, Family Law’s Loose Canon, 93 TEX. L. REV. 681, 703 (2015) 
(reviewing JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED (2014)).   
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mother left the one-year-old with the couple, then strangers, at a gas station 
after a few minutes of conversation.5 
Numerous factors contribute to the surprises caused when applying 
imprecise nature of childcare parentage laws.  These include variances in 
terminology, differing standards for the same situation in different states, 
differing parentage standards in different contexts within the same state, 
inconsistent disestablishment norms both inter- and intrastate, and choice 
of law complications in assessing childcare parentage.  This Part explores 
each of these factors in turn, and then examines the import of parental 
intentions to imprecise childcare parentage. 
A.   Common Elements of Childcare Parentage Establishment 
A preliminary challenge with childcare parentage laws is that they 
utilize varying titles, including de facto parenthood, presumed parent, 
equitable adoption, and parentage by estoppel.6  In a single state, two or 
more appellations might be used to cover differing forms of imprecise 
childcare parentage.7  Sometimes, the same appellation has different 
meanings in different states.8  Further, imprecise childcare parentage 
appellations do not always mean what they appear to mean.  For example, a 
woman married to a birth mother is sometimes eligible to become a 
presumed childcare “father.”9  Finally, a person’s imprecise parentage 
establishment can sometimes follow the rebuttal of that person’s precise 
parentage establishment, such as when a child’s mother’s former husband 
loses his marital paternity presumption due to lack of biological ties, but 
 
 5  In re M.M.G., 287 P.3d 952, 953–54 (Mont. 2012) (remanding to determine 
possible parentage for the couple).   
 6  For a comprehensive survey of such laws, see Jeffrey A. Parness, Parentage Law 
(R)Evolution: The Key Questions, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 743, 752–63 (2013).   
 7  Consider the imprecise childcare parentage laws in Delaware, where there is a “de 
facto” parent, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c)(3) (West 2016) (de facto parentage where 
one acts in a “parental role”), and a “presumed parent,” id. § 8-204(a)(5) (establishing 
presumed parentage where one “held out the child as [one’s] own”). 
 8  Consider de facto parent status.  In Delaware, there is childcare parentage for a de 
facto parent, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c), while in the District of Colombia one can 
seek “third party” custody as a “de facto parent,” D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-831.01, 831.03.   
 9  See TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 160.106, 160.201(b), 160.204(a) (West 2015) (providing 
that paternity provisions, as with the law establishing presumed paternity for a man holding 
out a child as one’s own, apply to maternity determinations); see also In re Guardianship of 
Madelyn B., 98 A.3d 494, 502 (N.H. 2014) (holding that presumed “father” statute applied 
equally to a man or a woman); Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.3d 283, 287–88 (N.M. 2012) 
(holding that former lesbian partner of an adoptive mother can be a presumed natural parent 
under a statute on presuming a “man . . . to be the natural father of a child” (quoting 
Uniform Parentage Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-5(A)(4) (1986), repealed by New Mexico 
Uniform Parentage Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-11A-101 to -903 (2010)).   
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receives imprecise parentage establishment under the equitable parent 
doctrine.10 
Many imprecise childcare parentage establishment laws—both 
statutory and common law—demand that a person reside with the child as a 
prerequisite to parentage.  While some laws set out a minimum period of 
residency,11 others do not.12  These laws frequently lead to recognition of a 
second parent on equal footing with the child’s custodial biological or 
adoptive parent.13 
A second common requisite for establishing imprecise childcare 
parentage requires that the person provided prior financial support to the 
child.  While some laws require significant support and specify 
requirements,14 others do not.15 
Yet another common element involves whether the alleged new 
childcare parent previously held himself out in the community as a parent.  
Some laws specifically require a person to hold out the child as his or her 
own on the basis of natural or biological bonds.16  Others, though, are less 
precise, and simply require that the child be held out as the person’s own.17 
 
 10  See, e.g., Vanderark v. Vanderark, No. 291216, 2009 WL 2448293 (Mich. Ct. App. 
Aug. 11, 2009) (per curiam) (overcoming, seemingly, husband’s presumed paternity, a 
doctrine recognized in Barnes v. Jeudevine, 718 N.W.2d 311, 314 (Mich. 2006)).   
 11  See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-504(a)(v) (West 2016) (requiring that a 
presumed parent resides “in the same household” for first two years of child’s life).   
 12  See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-105(1)(d) (West 2015) (presuming natural 
fatherhood for man who “receives the child” into his home “while the child is under the age 
of majority”).   
 13  See, e.g., Morgan v. Weiser, 923 A.2d 1183, 1187 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (stating 
that once established, rights and liabilities arising from in loco parentis relationship are the 
same as those arising from biological or formal adoptive parenthood); see also DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8-201(c), 8-203 (West 2016) (mandating that de facto parentage establishes 
a parent-child relationship on par with the parent-child relationship of a birth or formal 
adoptive parent).   
 14  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-204(a)(5) (West 2016) (presuming parentage where 
person established “a significant parental relationship with the child by providing emotional 
and financial support for the child”).   
 15  See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-43(a)(5) (West 2016) (presuming parentage may 
be founded, in part, for one who “provides support for the child”).   
 16  See id. (stating that a presumed parent holds out child as a “natural child”); see also 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.55(d) (West 2016) (defining presumed parent as one who “holds 
out the child as his biological child”).   
 17  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-204(a)(5) (West 2016) (deeming one a presumed 
parent if he “openly held out the child as his own”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-504(a)(v) 
(West 2016) (deeming one a presumed parent if he “openly held out the child as his own”).   
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B.   Contextual Challenges to Parentage Establishment Intrastate 
Even within a single state, imprecise childcare parentage laws pose 
challenges because there are sometimes wide variations in the definition of 
“parentage” across contexts.  Parentage for childcare purposes often differs 
from parentage in other settings.  Some parentage establishment laws in 
probate settings recognize parentage when there is a subjective intent to 
adopt, while such intent is insufficient to establish parentage in childcare 
settings.18  Further, parentage can differ between childcare and child 
support settings.  For example, state laws usually deem biological fathers 
financially responsible for their children born to unwed mothers; yet, these 
same fathers are often not entitled to seek childcare orders since their 
parental childcare opportunities have been initially seized, or their seized 
childcare opportunity has not yielded continuing childcare worthy of 
parental status.19 
A Florida case in May 2006 recognized intrastate legal parentage 
variations dependent upon context.20  In the case, an unwed biological 
father claimed parentage in an adoption proceeding.  There was 
inconsistency between the Florida statutes on formal adoptions—especially 
the provisions on putative father registry filings, which entitled only those 
unwed biological fathers who registered to notice of, and participation in, 
later adoption proceedings—and the provisions on child support paternity 
lawsuits involving unwed biological fathers, which allowed money orders 
founded solely on biological ties.21  The court observed: 
This case demonstrates that Florida has taken substantially different 
statutory approaches to the rights and responsibilities of biological 
fathers of children born to unmarried mothers depending upon the issue 
at stake.  In cases of adoption, we wish to minimize unmarried 
 
 18  Compare Greenfield v. Daniels, 51 So. 3d 421, 429 (Fla. 2010) (holding that the 
deceased biological father did need to acknowledge responsibility in order to be obligated to 
provide child support), and DeHart v. DeHart 986 N.E.2d 85, 104 (Ill. 2013) (stating that 
“objective evidence of an intent to adopt” by decedent can prompt recognition of an 
equitable adoption in a probate setting; no recognition if evidence only shows a person (like 
a foster parent or stepparent) treats a child “lovingly and on an equal basis with his or her 
natural or legally adopted children”), with C.G. v. J.R., 130 So. 3d 776, 780–81 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2014) (holding that child did not have survivor’s claim, regardless of recognition, 
related to deceased biological father where child had been born into an intact marriage that 
closed off biological father’s childcare interests), and In re Scarlett Z.-D., 428 N.E.3d 776, 
792 (Ill. 2015) (holding that subjective intent to adopt that is employed for equitable 
adoption in probate setting does not apply to “proceedings for parentage, custody, and 
visitation”).   
 19  See, e.g., In re C.N., 839 N.W.2d 841, 844–45 (N.D. 2013); see also In re 
Adoption of Baby A., 944 So. 2d 380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).   
 20  In re Adoption of Baby A., 944 So.2d 380.   
 21  Id. at 389–91.  
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biological fathers’ rights.  When the state seeks to declare a child 
dependent, the unmarried biological father’s rights are guarded in the 
hopes the father will fulfill his parental obligations to the child.  In cases 
of child support, especially when the state seeks reimbursement of 
welfare payments, we attempt to maximize the unmarried biological 
father’s responsibilities.  Whether Florida needs a unified policy for the 
rights of such biological fathers or whether varying policies can coexist 
is an interesting issue that is raised, but certainly not resolved, in this 
case.22 
As the Florida court suggests, intrastate contextual variations in legal 
parentage can be reasonable.  For example, some biological fathers should 
have no participation rights in any formal adoption proceedings involving 
their offspring, but nevertheless should be held accountable for child 
support for those same offspring should there be no formal adoption.  
Sensibly, child abandonment ends paternal adoption notice interests, but 
not paternal financial support duties. 
Similarly, some biological fathers may have no custody or visitation 
rights with their children who reside with their birth mothers, but 
nevertheless will be held responsible for child support.  On such variations, 
the Sixth Circuit in N.E. v. Hedges observed: 
[T]here are no judicial decisions recognizing a constitutional right of a 
man to terminate his duties of support under state law for a child that he 
has fathered, no matter how removed he may be emotionally from the 
child.  Child support has long been a tax fathers have had to pay in 
Western civilization.  For reasons of child welfare and social utility, if 
not for moral reasons, the biological relationship between a father and 
his offspring—even if unwanted and unacknowledged—remains 
constitutionally sufficient to support paternity tests and child support 
requirements.  We do not have a system of government like ancient 
Sparta where male children are taken over early in their lives by the 
state for military service.  The biological parents remain responsible for 
their welfare.  One of the ways the state enforces this duty is through 
paternity laws.  This responsibility is not growing weaker in our body 
politic . . . but stronger.23 
Other intrastate variations in legal parentage are less reasonable.  In 
Iowa, for example, a man is a father “for certain purposes” due to a marital 
paternity presumption, requiring childcare opportunities and child support 
responsibilities, but is not a “parent” who is a necessary party when his 
child is subject to a statutory proceeding involving a child in need of 
 
 22  Id. at 395 n.21.  The court’s Baby A. ruling was disapproved by Heart of 
Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So.2d 189, 203 (Fla. 2007), but not the quoted language.   
 23  391 F.3d 832, 836 (6th Cir. 2004); accord Ex parte M.D.C., 39 So. 3d 1117, 1133 
(Ala. 2009).  See generally In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 745 n.4 (Iowa 2011); Merrill, supra 
note 3.   
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assistance.24  And in Mississippi, a child, per the in loco parentis doctrine, 
cannot recover on a parent’s death under the wrongful death statute, but can 
recover under the workers’ compensation statute.25  Whether reasonable or 
not, these examples illustrate the importance of context in many American 
states’ childcare parentage laws. 
C.   Disestablishment of Childcare Parentage Intrastate and Interstate 
Whether established at precise or imprecise moments, childcare 
parentage can be rebutted, rescinded, or otherwise overridden under the 
law.  As with parentage establishment, there are imprecise parentage 
disestablishment standards that vary not only intrastate in differing 
contexts, but also interstate within the same context. 
Two common forms of precise childcare parentage are a voluntary 
parentage acknowledgment (VAP) and a marital parentage presumption.  
Each form designates one a parent under law at a precise point in time: a 
VAP usually does so at the moment of execution or filing, and the marital 
parentage presumption typically recognizes parentage in a person at the 
moment his or her spouse becomes pregnant, is pregnant, or gives birth.  
Both VAP and marital parentage presumption usually contemplate the 
possibility of biological ties between a child and a newly recognized parent 
who is not the birth mother. 
Standards for challenging or rescinding a VAP differ intrastate from 
those for rebutting a marital presumption.  While establishment of both of 
these forms of childcare parentage occurs at a precise time, their respective 
disestablishment standards sometimes depend upon conduct occurring at no 
precise point in time.  VAP disestablishment norms are driven, in large 
part, by federal statutes.  Federal laws generously allow rescissions by VAP 
signatories within sixty days of signing; but federal laws bar VAP 
challenges after sixty days by signatories in the absence of fraud, duress, or 
material mistake of fact.26  By contrast, rebuttal norms for marital 
parentage presumptions favoring the spouses of birth mothers are left 
entirely to state lawmakers,27 regardless of when challenges are presented. 
 
 24  In re J.C., 857 N.W.2d 495, 501, 505 (Iowa 2014).   
 25  Estate of Smith v. Smith, 130 So. 3d 508, 512–15 (Miss. 2014) (en banc) 
(differentiating disparate results due to the express language in the two statutes).   
 26  42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(ii)–(iii) (2012).  States participating in certain federal 
welfare programs are required to adhere to § 666.  42 U.S.C. § 654(20).  The federal statutes 
are described in Jayna Morse Cacioppo, Note, Voluntary Acknowledgments of Paternity: 
Should Biology Play a Role in Determining Who Can Be a Legal Father?, 38 IND. L. REV. 
479, 486–88 (2005).  The state rescission statutes are listed and described in Paula Roberts, 
Truth and Consequences: Part III.  Who Pays When Paternity is Disestablished?, 37 FAM. 
L.Q. 69, 82–90 (2003).   
 27  Broad state lawmaking, within federal constitutional limits of course, was 
recognized in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129 (1989) (plurality opinion), and 
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Within a single state, there are different imprecise disestablishment 
norms relevant to VAPs and to marital parentage presumptions.  Thus in 
Louisiana, as in other states, VAPs may be contested by male signatories 
after sixty days if there is shown fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact,28 
circumstances often not occurring at a precise moment in time.  But in 
Louisiana, though not in all other states, a husband may seek a disavowal 
of a marital paternity presumption29 more than one year after birth if he acts 
within “one year” of “the day the husband knew or should have known that 
he may not be the biological father of the child,” again a circumstance that 
need not occur at a precise moment in time.30  In California, as well, 
different imprecise parentage disestablishment norms operate for VAPs and 
for marital parentage presumptions.31 
As to childcare parentage disestablishment norms interstate, consider 
again VAPs.  Notwithstanding the aforementioned federal statutory norms, 
there are significant interstate variations in VAP parentage 
 
confirmed when the very California marital parentage presumption laws affirmed in 
Michael H. were later amended via CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541(a) (West 2016).  Compare 750 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/8(a)(3) (1984) (repealed 2015) (stating marital paternity 
presumption may be disestablished by presumed father-husband within two years after he 
obtained “knowledge of relevant facts”), and 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.  46/205(b) (West 
2016) (using similar language to original statute: “knew or should have known of the 
relevant facts”), with In re Parentage of John M., 817 N.E.2d 500, 511 (Ill. 2004) (stating 
that standards on biological father’s opportunity to disestablish husband’s presumed marital 
parentage and to establish his own paternity under Illinois law are unclear, and involve 
“public policy” issues better addressed by the General Assembly).  See generally Roberts, 
supra note 26, app. at 94–95 (state marital paternity presumption rebuttal statutes are listed 
and described).   
 28  LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:406(B)(1) (2016) (indicating a male signatory can revoke after 
sixty days by showing that he “is not the biological parent of the child,” an opportunity 
contrary to federal law mandates for states participating in the federal (Title IV-D) welfare 
subsidy program, 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D) (ii)–(iii), and rendering superfluous the statutory 
fraud, duress, and mistake conditions for VAP contests); see also Rousseve v. Jones, 704 
So. 2d 229, 233 (La. 1997) (stating that when acknowledgment of biological ties between 
man and child is “ultimately untrue, the acknowledgment may be null, absent some 
overriding concern of public policy”).  This approach is not employed to disavowals of 
marital paternity presumptions as only there are children legitimated.  See e.g., DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (West 2016); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-831.01, 831.03 (West 2016).   
 29  Though not for “a child born to his wife as a result of an assisted conception to 
which he consented.”  LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 188 (2016).   
 30  Id. art. 189. 
 31  Compare CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(e) (West 2016) (stating that male VAP signor, a 
presumed parent per § 7611, may only have the VAP set aside if it is deemed in “the best 
interest[] of the child”), with id. § 7541 (stating that notwithstanding marital paternity 
presumption, within two years of birth, a husband can seek blood tests; where husband is 
found not to be the biological father, “the question of paternity of the husband shall be 
resolved accordingly”).   
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disestablishment guidelines.32  These differing disestablishment guidelines 
include both precise and imprecise norms.  Precise statutory norms speak to 
matters like the time limits on VAP challenges and who may challenge.33  
Imprecise norms speak to matters like estoppel, barring VAP challenges 
due to earlier post-signing conduct that occurred at no precise point in 
time.34 
There are also significant interstate variations in the standards for 
rebutting a marital parentage presumption.  To establish such a 
presumption, state parentage laws are generally quite precise, with 
parentage dependent upon satisfying specific conditions at certain moments 
in time.  There are differences in the relevant conditions or moments in 
time across states.  For example, concerning the timing of the marriage, 
some state laws look at marriage at the time of birth or conception35 while 
others look only to marriage at the time of birth.36  As to the rebuttal of 
such a presumption, again there can be precise laws, such as those barring a 
rebuttal after a certain period of time after birth.37  But there can also be 
imprecise marital parentage rebuttal norms. 
In some states there can be no rebuttal of a marital parentage 
presumption by anyone outside the marriage so long as the married couple 
is “committed to remaining married” and to raising “the child as issue of 
 
 32  Incidentally, there are sometimes also significant variations in the precedents in a 
single state, especially where the statutes on acknowledgement are unclear.  See, e.g., Kelly 
M. Greco & Stephanie R. Hammer, Challenging Voluntary Acknowledgments of Paternity, 
102 ILL. B.J. 432, 452 (2014) (pointing to “[u]ncertainty in Illinois law”).   
 33  Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-308(a)(1) (West 2016) (“a signatory of an 
acknowledgment”), with MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.1011(1) (repealed 2012) (mother, 
signing man, child, or prosecuting attorney), and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-307(1) (West 
2016) (“signatory” or “a support-enforcement agency”), with ALA. CODE 26-17-609(b) 
(2016) (“If a child has an acknowledged father, an individual, who is not a signatory to the 
acknowledgment of paternity and who seeks an adjudication of paternity of the child may 
maintain a proceeding at any time after the effective date of the acknowledgment if the court 
determines that it is in the best interest of the child.”).   
 34  See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/610(a) (West 2016) (inequity and “child’s best 
interests”); N.Y. FAM. CT. LAW § 516-a(b) (McKinney 2016) (after sixty days, equitable 
estoppel can operate); Jeffrey A. Parness & Zachary Townsend, For Those Not John 
Edwards: More and Better Paternity Acknowledgments at Birth, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 53, 87 
(2010) (surveying rescission requirements in several states); Cacioppo, supra note 26, at 
494–99 (reviewing VAP challenge cases).   
 35  Compare 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/5(a)(1) (1984) (repealed 2015) (“born or 
conceived”), with 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/204(a)(1) (West 2016) (“born”).  See also 
ME. R. EVID. 302 (West 2016) (“born” or “conceived”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.41(1)(a) 
(West 2015) (“conceived or born”).  
 36  CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(a) (West 2016) (“child is born during the marriage”).   
 37  See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 26, app. at 94–95 (reviewing state statutes).   
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the marriage,”38 circumstances often not occurring at precise moments.  
Elsewhere, rebuttals of a marital parentage presumption can be pursued by 
only certain biological fathers via an action to establish a parent-child 
relationship, with such fathers distinguished statutorily by their earlier acts 
occurring at no precise point in time,39 like “abandonment” or 
“desertion.”40  And as to a husband’s rebuttal, it can sometimes be 
foreclosed via the common law doctrine of paternity by estoppel as long as 
the child’s best interests are served, again a circumstance occurring at no 
precise time.41 
D.   Choice of Parentage Laws 
Finally, when imprecise parentage law disputes involve conduct in 
two or more states (or two or more countries), the significant interstate (and 
international) variations in parentage establishment and disestablishment 
norms within a single context can lead to difficult choice of law issues.  
The need to choose among competing laws (such as where there are “true 
conflicts”) too often goes unrecognized, resulting in some odd rulings. 
The extreme case of Johnson v. Johnson, resolved by the North 
Dakota Supreme Court in 2000,42 illustrates one such ruling.  There, 
Antonyio Johnson first sought to divorce Madonna Johnson in North 
Dakota in July 1998.  Madonna sought child support for her granddaughter, 
Jessica, who Madonna urged had been equitably adopted by Antonyio 
under North Dakota law.43 
The Johnsons were married in September 1986, with no child ever 
born to Madonna during the marriage.  But in August 1988, the Johnsons, 
then living in New Jersey, took custody of Jessica, then three months old 
 
 38  R.P. v. K.S.W., 320 P.3d 1084, 1093, 1099 (Utah Ct. App. 2014) (interpreting 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-607(1) (West 2016) and assuming “no constitutional 
challenge”); see also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.070(1)(b), (2) (West 2016); Strauser v. 
Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052 (Pa. 1999).   
 39  See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/608(a) (West 2016) (allowing two years to 
file from time petitioner “knew or should have known of the relevant facts”).  The 
circumstances allowing such an establishment remain, however, unclear.  See 750 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/610(a)(2)–(3) (West 2016) (stating it to be inequitable to disestablish 
husband as presumed parent; in child’s best interest not to allow establishment).   
 40  See, e.g., In re Waites, 152 So. 3d 306, 314 (Miss. 2014) (en banc) (holding that for 
child born of adultery to wife during marriage, biological father can seek custody as long as 
there is “no clear and convincing evidence of abandonment, desertion, immoral conduct 
detrimental to the child, and/or unfitness” and husband may not seek custody if there is no 
such evidence though he has “standing in loco parentis,” which allows him to seek third 
party visitation (quoting Davis v. Vaughn, 126 So. 3d 33, 37 (Miss. 2013))).   
 41  See, e.g., K.E.M. v. P.C.S., 38 A.3d 798 (Pa. 2012).   
 42  617 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 2000).   
 43  Id. at 101.   
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and the natural granddaughter of Madonna, in Pennsylvania.44  While 
Jessica was scheduled to remain with the Johnsons for only a month, ten 
years later, at the time of the North Dakota divorce, Jessica was still with 
the Johnsons.45  During that decade, Jessica was raised as the Johnsons’ 
child.  The Johnsons had initiated formal adoption proceedings in New 
Jersey and Kentucky—where Jessica’s natural parents lived—but neither of 
those proceedings were completed due to the Johnsons’ military work 
transfers.46  From August 1988 to May 1997 the Johnsons resided in New 
Jersey and Florida, with Antonyio sometimes deployed overseas.  Antonyio 
was sent to Grand Forks, North Dakota, in May 1998.47  By then, Antonyio 
and Madonna were not living together.  Madonna and Jessica therefore 
never lived in North Dakota. 
The North Dakota Supreme Court looked to cases on “contract to 
adopt” only in the context of inheritance law.48  It determined that the 
public policy of the state supported application of the doctrine of equitable 
adoption “to impose a child support obligation under certain 
circumstances” and that nothing in North Dakota law forbade it.49  The 
court remanded for resolution of factual issues involving the application of 
the North Dakota equitable adoption doctrine to Antonyio.50 
A dissenting justice began: “This is a case of a grandmother and her 
grandchild who have never lived in North Dakota.”51  He went on: “[I]t is 
clear that if an ‘equitable adoption’ took place, it took place in New Jersey 
or Kentucky and would therefore be governed by the law of one of those 
states.”52  In both New Jersey and Kentucky there is no equitable adoption 
doctrine.53  New Jersey or Kentucky law was deemed appropriate by the 
dissent under North Dakota choice of law rules for contract cases.54 
The majority did not respond to these observations.  Unfortunately, no 
opinion in Johnson considered utilizing an interest analysis to determine 
 
 44  Id. at 100. 
 45  Id.  
 46  Id.  
 47  Id. at 101. 
 48  Id. at 103.   
 49  Id. at 109.  Such an application of the equitable adoption doctrine, however, was 
“limited” as the court expressed “preference for adherence to statutory procedures” on 
formal adoptions.  Id. at 106 n.3.   
 50  Id. at 109–10.   
 51  Id. at 112 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).   
 52  Id.  
 53  Id.  
 54  Id. at 123 (“[I]t objectively appears that our precedent would mandate the 
application of another forum’s law because the alleged contract arose in either Kentucky or 
New Jersey and was performed in either of those states, the subject matter was in either of 
those states, and the domicile of all parties was in either of those states at the time the 
alleged contract was made.”).   
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which state’s imprecise parentage law on equitable adoption in the child 
support context might operate.  And no opinion considered whether to 
decline jurisdiction altogether, or at least over the parentage, if not the child 
support, issue as to Antonyio.55  Further, no opinion addressed any 
difference between Antonyio’s legal parenthood in child support and 
childcare settings. 
E.   The Importance of Parental Intentions to Imprecise Parentage 
In the childcare context—as well as others, like child support—
imprecise American state parentage establishment and disestablishment 
laws frequently require courts to look back in time to assess both an alleged 
new legal parent’s and an existing legal parent’s earlier intentions 
regarding the alleged new parent’s future relationship with the existing 
parent’s child.  In looking back, courts do not focus on a precise point in 
time as they often do with VAPs or marital parentage presumptions.  
Accordingly, formal declarations of such intentions would greatly assist the 
courts in looking back at past events.  Such declarations could or could not 
be registered with the state56 and should involve processes assuring the 
declarations were likely truthful when made.  Before further exploring how 
such declarations might be made, this Section briefly reviews the roles 
played by such intentions in imprecise childcare parentage laws. 
Imprecise childcare parentage laws can directly or indirectly speak to 
an existing parent’s intentions regarding a nonparent who may one day 
become a parent.  Direct speech is exemplified by a Delaware statute that 
says that a de facto parent can only be recognized where a parental-like 
relationship developed between a child and a nonparent with the “support 
and consent” of a legal parent.57  Indirect speech on a legal parent’s 
intent—that is, a statute implying there needs to be parental intent without 
expressly saying so—is exemplified by a New Jersey statute that declares 
there can be “presumed” childcare parentage for a nonparent who earlier 
openly held out the child as his natural child and provided support for the 
child,58 actions that are likely known and sanctioned by a legal parent. 
 
 55  See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-14.1-18 (West 2016) (stating that trial court may 
decline to exercise its child custody jurisdiction if it provides an “inconvenient forum,” 
measured, for example, by the nature and location of any evidence, the length of time the 
child resided outside North Dakota, and the financial resources of the parties).   
 56   Unregistered formal declarations of intent that are later utilized include wills, while 
registered formal declarations of intent that are later utilized include certifications on 
putative father registries for adoption notice purposes.   
 57  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c)(1) (West 2016).   
 58  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-43(a)(4)–(5) (West 2016) (indicating no need for a 
legal parent’s knowledge or agreement, where the nonparent attains equal footing with the 
legal parent per N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-40).   
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Comparably, imprecise childcare parentage laws can also speak 
directly or indirectly to a nonparent’s intentions regarding the development 
of a new or continuing parental-like relationship with a child.  Speaking 
directly, some state presumed childcare parentage laws require that the 
nonparent hold out the child as his or her own “natural child.”59  Speaking 
indirectly, and thus not expressly demanding parental intentions, some 
states’ imprecise childcare parentage laws require that the nonparent 
provided financial assistance to the child while holding out the child as 
one’s own, but require no actions indicating any belief as to biological ties, 
which more clearly suggest one’s consciousness of possible legal 
parentage.60 
Incidentally, some intent from an existing legal parent regarding a 
potential new legal parent seems constitutionally required.  It is 
fundamentally unfair, for example, for an existing parent to now have to 
share—and battle for—custody, visitation, parental responsibility 
allocations, and the like with another who had neither actual or presumed 
biological ties, nor formal adoptive ties to the child, where the legal parent 
did nothing to encourage the parental-like acts of the other and, in fact, 
intended always to remain a single parent under law.61  Likewise, it is 
fundamentally unfair for a one-time nonparent to be saddled with future 
child support obligations, perhaps accompanying new childcare 
opportunities as a new legal parent, where the nonparent never did, or 
never will, pursue childcare interests in court and, in fact, always intended 
not to develop a parental-like relationship with, nor to provide support for, 
the child.62 
II.     FACILITATING FORMAL DECLARATIONS OF ASSUMED OR INTENDED 
PARENTAL CHILDCARE 
Courts often recognize the importance of express written declarations 
of assumed or intended childcare parentage.  Wills sometimes indicate 
assumed childcare parentage by decedents for purposes of property 
disposition upon death.  Putative father registries indicate intended future 
childcare parentage for purposes of later adoption proceedings.  Written 
declarations of current or future childcare are only produced in court when 
there is a need to examine an alleged current or future parent-child 
relationship.  Earlier declarations of assumed childcare, or of future 
 
 59  See id. § 9:17-43(a); see also ALA. CODE § 26-17-204(a)(5) (2016) (nonparent 
holding out that there are “natural” ties can establish parentage).   
 60  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-204(a)(5) (West 2016); see also Jeffrey A. Parness, 
Constitutional Constraints on Second Parent Laws, 40 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 811, 830 (2014) 
(describing similar state laws).   
 61  See, e.g., Parness, supra note 60, at 811.   
 62  Id. at 842–45.   
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parental childcare intentions, could be used, to assist later courts in 
imprecise parental childcare settings.  As this Part shows, the guidelines on 
wills and putative father registries provide much aid for those 
contemplating new laws on the employment of declarations of assumed and 
intended parental-like acts in later imprecise childcare parentage disputes. 
 
A.   Wills 
 
Illinois law illustrates how earlier formal declarations of assumed 
childcare parentage involving those now deceased are employed in 
property dispositions during probate.  One law recognizes a duty in one 
“named as executor of the will of a deceased person” to “institute a 
proceeding,” usually geared to having “the will admitted to probate.”63  
Within six months after the admission, “any interested person may file a 
petition . . . to contest the validity of the will.”64  Only then will a 
determination of imprecise childcare parentage formally declared in the 
will be made.65  Comparably, when there is no will, a probate court will 
explore parentage in the decedent relevant to intestacy laws, where legal 
parentage is often determined for the first time based upon the decedent’s 
earlier informal declarations on parenthood, such as through oral 
statements indicating promises or intentions to adopt, as well as formal 
declarations of parenthood, like private written acknowledgments.66 
B.   Putative Father Registries 
Comparably, earlier formal declarations of intended childcare via 
putative father registries by alleged biological fathers, who are not then 
presumed, adjudicated, or acknowledged fathers (usually of children born 
of consensual sex), are employed in later adoption proceedings (often 
initiated by the post-birth husbands of the birth mothers, by prospective 
 
 63  755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6-3(a) (West 2016) (stating that the proceeding may 
also involve a named executor declaring a “refusal to act as executor”).   
 64  Id. 5/8-1(a).   
 65  See, e.g., id. 5/2-4(c) (“For purposes of inheritance from the child . . . a child is 
adopted when the child . . . is declared or assumed to be the adopted child of the testator or 
grantor in any instrument bequeathing or giving property to the child.”).   
 66  See, e.g., DeHart v. DeHart, 986 N.E.2d 85, 93, 104–05 (Ill. 2013) (recognizing a 
nonmarital child who was never formally adopted by the decedent could nevertheless be 
“the natural object” of the decedent’s bounty via the common law doctrine of equitable 
adoption); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2114(b)(iii) (West 2016) (stating that a 
“man is considered to be the child’s natural father for purposes of intestate successions” if 
the “man and the child have established a mutually acknowledged relationship of parent and 
child that begins before the child becomes age 18 and continues until terminated by the 
death of either”).   
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adopting persons, or by couples after birth mothers relinquish custody).67  
Such formal declarations usually can be filed before birth, but sometimes 
must be filed no later than very shortly after birth (fifteen to thirty days).68  
Frequently, they must precede the filing of an adoption petition or a 
petition for termination of parental rights.69 
C.   Formal Declarations of Assumed or Intended Parental Childcare 
Formal declarations of earlier assumed parental childcare appear in 
wills where such declarations may or may not be persuasive in later probate 
proceedings.  Formal declarations of earlier intended parental childcare 
appear in putative father registries where such declarations may or may not 
be persuasive in later adoption or parental rights termination proceedings.  
Comparably, formal declarations of assumed or intended parental childcare 
could be persuasive in later imprecise childcare parentage proceedings. 
New laws on assumed or intended parental childcare declarations in 
imprecise parentage proceedings can be modeled on the California laws 
allowing, but not requiring, the use of General Assembly forms on intended 
parentage in later parentage disputes involving children “conceived through 
assisted reproduction” not involving “agreements for gestational carriers or 
surrogacy agreements.”70  There, the optional forms reflect the statutory 
“writing requirement” on parentage in varied assisted reproduction 
settings.71  Credibility is enhanced as the forms demand notarized 
signatures and recognize the potential penalty of perjury.  Like wills, and 
unlike putative father registrations, the California forms are not filed with 
the government at the time of execution. 
As in California, other state legislatures or agencies could develop 
forms in and outside of assisted reproduction that reflect their own state’s 
imprecise childcare parentage norms operating in both the parentage 
establishment and disestablishment settings.  One or more persons could 
 
 67  Putative father registry laws are well reviewed in Mary Beck, A National Putative 
Father Registry, 36 CAPITAL U. L. REV. 295 (2007) (supporting a national registry 
established by Congress), which is accompanied by Lindsay Biesterfeld, Appendix, Survey 
of Putative Father Registries by State, 36 CAPITAL U. L. REV. 339 (2007).   
 68  Biesterfeld, supra note 67, at 339–61 (thirty days after birth in Delaware, Illinois, 
Ohio, and Minnesota; fifteen days after birth in Missouri; ten days after birth in New 
Mexico; and seventy-two hours after birth in Montana).   
 69  Id. (prior to adoption petition in Arkansas and Indiana and prior to petition for 
termination of parental rights in Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, and Massachusetts).   
 70  CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613.5(a), (c) (West 2016) (stating that use of form does “not 
preclude a court from considering any other claims to parentage under California statute or 
case law”).   
 71  Id. § 7613.5(d) (referencing § 7613).  Available forms include assisted 
reproduction undertaken by two married or unmarried people, where the signatories may or 
may not have used their own sperm or eggs to conceive a child.   
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sign the optional forms.  A biological father of a child born of sex could 
declare that he has no intent to childcare.  A birth mother could declare her 
acquiescence in her new partner assuming a parental-like role.  Both a birth 
mother and her soon-to-be spouse could declare their intentions to raise her 
child jointly upon marriage. 
Credibility should be promoted, as in California, by dictates on notary 
acknowledgments, warnings of possible perjury charges, and 
encouragements of attorney consultations.  Informed declarations should 
also be promoted by including within the forms the legal requisites—set 
forth in plain language—and citations to relevant statutes, regulations, and 
judicial precedents.  State governments could give parties the choice to file 
their forms with the relevant governmental department at the time of 
execution. 
Singular signature intended childcare parentage forms could include 
reformulated prebirth putative father registrations, which would be deemed 
directly relevant by statute outside of adoption-parental rights termination 
proceedings.72  These earlier registrations indicating a desire to undertake 
childcare of any future child could be employed in a later paternity 
proceeding involving an alleged or actual unwed biological father seeking a 
childcare order involving an existing child over the birth mother’s 
objection.  Comparably, earlier prebirth registrations by alleged or actual 
biological fathers indicating desires not to undertake childcare of any later-
born children could be employed in any later proceeding involving 
attempts by those fathers to establish their own de facto parentage.  Prebirth 
declarations as to future childcare intentions would help courts determine 
whether unwed biological fathers have federal constitutional childcare 
interests since those interests typically only arise if the fathers formed a 
 
 72  Putative father registries are now chiefly used in adoption proceedings to determine 
whether unwed biological fathers must be noticed about, and given chances to participate in, 
adoption proceedings involving their children born of consensual sex to unwed mothers who 
may (i.e., stepfather adoption) or may not continue as childcare parents.  See, e.g., Mary 
Beck, Toward A National Putative Father Registry Database, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
1031, 1033 (2002) (reviewing American state laws and arguing “for a national putative 
father registry database,” in part, because paternity efforts can now be thwarted by interstate 
travel); Karen Greenberg et al., A National Responsible Father Registry: Providing 
Constitutional Protections for Children, Mothers and Fathers, 13 WHITTIER J. CHILD & 
FAM. ADVOC. 85, 86 (2014) (same).  Putative father registries outside of adoption or parental 
rights termination can be deemed pertinent, for example, in de facto childcare parent 
settings where intentions to assume legal parenthood are relevant, if not dispositive.  But see 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(g) (“A person’s offer or refusal to sign a voluntary declaration of 
paternity may be considered as a factor, but shall not be determinative, as to the issue of 
legal parentage in any proceedings regarding the establishment or termination of parental 
rights.”).   
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“significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship” with the 
children.73 
Singular signature intended childcare parentage forms could also 
include paternity acknowledgments, like those recommended within the 
1973 (though not the 2000) Uniform Parentage Act.74  There, a man is a 
presumed natural father if he acknowledges paternity in writing within the 
state and the birth mother “does not dispute” the acknowledgment in a 
writing filed with the state “within a reasonable time after being 
informed.”75 
Multiple signature forms indicating earlier assumed and continuing, or 
newly intended, childcare parentage can include premarital or mid-
marriage declarations addressing current and/or intended parental-like 
childcare by a prospective or current stepparent of a child who is in the sole 
custody of the one parent then recognized under law.  In 2012, the Uniform 
State Law Commissioners recognized that such declarations, while not 
contracts that bind courts, should “guide” courts making childcare 
decisions.76 
Multiple signature forms containing declarations of intended childcare 
parentage might be registered with the state at the time of execution, unlike 
premarital or mid-marriage pacts containing similar declarations.  Consider 
domestic partnership registrations, which could include not only intentions 
regarding future property distribution, but also intentions that will guide 
courts during future childcare disputes.77 
State statutes (or enabling regulations) recognizing the import of 
earlier formal declarations of assumed or intended parental childcare in 
imprecise childcare parentage settings, via discretionary forms available for 
 
 73  Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).   
 74  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973).   
 75  Id. § 4(a)(5).  The recommendation has not been widely adopted.  But see 15 R.I. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-8-3(a)(4) (West 2016) (providing that man is a “presumed to be the 
natural father” via such an acknowledgement). 
 76  See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Parentage Prenups and Midnups, 31 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 343 (2015) (reviewing the recommendation while demonstrating how such agreements 
could guide judges hearing childcare, child support, and child creation disputes).   
 77  To date, domestic partnership registration laws have addressed property and 
inheritance rights, but have not contemplated childcare declarations.  See, e.g., ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2710(6)(c) (2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.07.400(2)(b) (West 
2016).  But see Gardenour v. Bondelle, 60 N.E.3d 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (child born of 
consensual assisted reproduction into a same-sex registered domestic partnership has two 
childcare parents, per precedents, with non-birth mother also a childcare parent due to 
marital parentage presumption).  For a more expansive view of possible family formation 
registrations—including cohabitation arrangements between those with no sexual 
relationships, including siblings; older children and their parents; and best friends, see 
generally Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Family Formation and the Home, 
104 KY. L.J. 449 (2016).   
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use during later judicial assessments in childcare disputes, could follow—
and be modeled on—earlier, instate common-law precedents.  Such 
precedents, for example, would have addressed the role of childcare 
agreements between parents and nonparents, or of singular 
acknowledgments of the parental-like intentions of nonparents.  Where 
forms are utilized, factual disputes as to earlier childcare intentions—as in 
assisted reproduction settings—can be more easily resolved.78  As 
imprecise childcare parentage norms differ widely interstate, lawmakers—
perhaps guided by the earlier works of in-state lawyers in drafting parental 
childcare pacts in marriage dissolution, premarital agreement, and assisted 
reproduction settings—must become familiar with their own state’s 
imprecise childcare parentage norms. 
CONCLUSION 
The fluidity of imprecise childcare parentage laws in American states, 
together with the significant intrastate and interstate variations in these 
laws, presents significant challenges to courts.  The same appellation, like 
“equitable adoption” or “de facto parent,” can have different meanings 
intrastate and interstate.  Women can be presumed legal fathers.  
Stepparents and grandparents can morph into fathers and mothers without 
formal adoptions due to earlier parental-like actions, which did not occur at 
precise moments in time. 
Imprecise American state childcare parentage establishment and 
disestablishment laws increasingly require courts to look back in time to 
assess parental-like conduct.  This retrospective inquiry is often quite 
difficult, as the parties at that point are frequently emotional, or motivated 
to interpret the same conduct differently, if not to fabricate.  Such 
retrospective inquiry is also often difficult when an existing single 
custodial parent dies. 
Courts would be aided in their inquiries into earlier parental-like acts 
in imprecise parentage childcare cases if clear indications of childcare 
intentions were earlier expressed by existing legal parents and by those 
looking forward to (further) pursuing a parental role.  Voluntary paternity 
acknowledgements do not now, and should not ever, cover such 
expressions.  They were meant, and should remain, for alleged biological 
fathers of children born of consensual sex.  States having imprecise 
parentage laws should facilitate later judicial inquiries into earlier parental-
 
 78  See Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 490 n.1, 500 (N.Y. 2016) 
(holding that where unwed same-sex female couple agreed to conceive and raise a child 
together, nonbiological, nonadoptive partner can be a childcare parent over birth mother’s 
objection; in the case, these was no written agreement or formal declaration of intent, and 
the facts involving alleged oral agreements and understandings about childcare were 
disputed).   
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like acts by establishing new mechanisms for formal declarations of 
assumed and intended parentage.  Such declarations would not control 
courts making childcare parentage determinations.  Rather, they would 
guide, helping courts apply their states’ imprecise childcare parentage laws 
that depend upon earlier actions and intentions of parents and nonparents 
regarding the continuing or future care and support of children.  New state 
mechanisms for formal declarations of assumed and intended childcare 
parentage should be developed after imprecise childcare parent laws are 
established through statutes or court decisions.  Such laws can demand 
respect for premarital or mid-marriage childcare pacts dealing, for example, 
with assumed and intended stepparent childcare, as well as for cohabitation 
pacts between single parents and their significant others. 
 
